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THE ADVERSE WITNESS RULE: A CURE
FOR A CONSPIRACY
J. B. SPENCE*
[R]egardless of the merits of the plaintiff's case, physicians who are
members of medical societies flock to the defense of their fellow member charged with malpractice and the plaintiff is relegated, for his expert
testimony, to the occasional lone wolf or heroic soul, who for the sake
of truth and justice has the courage to run the risk of ostracism by his
fellow practitioners and the cancellation of his public liability insurance
policy.,
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CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE

We have come a great distance from 1543, when Andreas Vesalius

of Brussels published the first comprehensive textbook on human anatomy.2 Understandably, medical procedures of today tend to compel all
of us to stand in awe at the techniques of our highly trained and, for the

most part, highly competent contemporary healers. It is to be expected,
therefore, that both the physicians and the general public sometimes
place the medical profession upon a pedestal far above the human characteristic of error. While the public's psychological confidence is perhaps

clinically beneficial, the refusal of the great majority' of doctors to recognize and point out an error of a colleague can be legally disastrous.
When a physician makes a mistake, it may result in a great amount
* J.D., University of Miami, Member, Florida Bar; Fellow, International Academy of
Trial Lawyers.
1. Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 484, 234 P.2d 34, 46 (1951).
2. A. VESAIUS, DE HumAns CORPoRis FABRICA (1543).

3. A survey made by the Boston University Law-Medicine Research Institute revealed
that out of 214 doctors, only 31% of the specialists and 27% of the general practitioners said
they would be willing to testify for the plaintiff if a surgeon, operating on a diseased kidney
removed the wrong one. W. PROSSER, LAW or TORTS 167 n. 45 (3d ed. 1964). In Agnew v.
Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d 118 (1959), a suit was brought against a group of
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of needless pain or prolonged recovery. Even more seriously, an oversight by a surgeon may lead to the loss of a limb or a life. When the damage done by the forgotten sponge, 4 gauze,5 cloth sack,' drainage tube,7 rubber tube,' or needle' can be translated into dollars and cents, the result frequently is a suit against a physician.' 0 Then, in an adversary proceeding,
the doctor must answer to one judge or perhaps six ordinary citizens for
an act or omission which may be highly technical and highly sophisticated.
Fortunately, for our system of justice, the courts have provided for
the use of expert testimony." In a medical malpractice case, this testimony usually revolves around the question of whether the defendant met
the applicable standard of care:'" (1) the degree of ability or skill possessed by other physicians in the same or similar community, neighborhood, or locality;'" (2) the degree of care, attention, diligence, or vigilance ordinarily exercised by those physicians in the application of their
skill; and (3) the special or extraordinary skill of the specialist, if the
physician involved has represented himself as possessing that knowledge.
Thus, the standard for judging a physician's performance is objective
-the performance of other physicians similarly situated. This obviously
requires the testimony of another physician to help the judge or jury to
render a sound judgment on the defendant's performance. 1 4 Yet, in practice, counsel for the plaintiff will find it difficult to coax any physician
into pointing out a colleague's errors. This "conspiracy of silence" is
evident no matter how lacking in skill or how negligent the defendant's
behavior.' 5 Various causes can be attributed for this ethical weakness:
doctors for "conspiracy to obstruct the ends of justice" by refusal to testify. See also Simon
v. Friedrich, 163 Misc. 112, 296 N.Y.S. 367 (City Ct. of N.Y. 1937); Johnson v. Winston, 68
Neb. 425, 94 N.W. 607 (1903); Coleman v. McCarthy, 53 R.I. 266, 165 A. 900 (1933).
4. Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772 (1951).
5. Walker Hosp. v. Pulley, 74 Ind. App. 659, 127 N.E. 559 (1920), reh. denied, 74 Ind.
App. 659, 128 N.E. 933 (1920).
6. Tiller v. Von Pohle, 72 Ariz. 11, 230 P.2d 213 (1951).
7. Null v. Stewart, 78 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1934).
8. Saucier v. Ross, 112 Misc. 306, 73 So. 49 (Miss. 1916).
9. Johnson v. Ely, 30 Tenn. App. 294, 205 S.W.2d 759 (1947).
10. Professional liability actions against practitioners date back to at least 1374. See Y. B.
Hill, 48 Edw. III, F. 6, pl. 11 (1374).
11. Indeed, since juries composed of laymen are normally incompetent to pass judgment
on questions of medical science or technique, "it has been held in the great majority of malpractice cases that there can be no finding of negligence in the absence of expert testimony to
support it." W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS 167 (3d ed. 1964).
12. D. LOuis.ELL & H. WiLIAisS, TRIAL OF MEDIcAL MALPRACrICE CASES, t 8.04, at 201
(1965).
13. The "locality rule" has come under very heavy and very convincing attack. See, e.g.,
Comment, Expert Testimony in Medical Malpractice Cases, 17 U. MAmI L. REV. 182 (1962).
See also D. LousSar.L & H. WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPACTICE CASES, ff 8.06, at 210
(1965); Kolesar v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Fla. 1961) (Court held that the
locality rule is obsolete).
14. See note 11 supra. Where the matter is of common knowledge, as where a surgeon
saws off the wrong leg, or where there is a part of the body not within the operative field
injured, it has been held that the jury may infer negligence without the aid of an expert. W.
PaOSSER, LAw OF TORTS 167 (3d ed. 1964).
1S. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 568, 317
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prestige, the fear of insurance costs, social ostracism, and the like.16 The

fact of the matter is, however, that the court and the jury may not receive
the benefit of the training and experience of the expert. On the other hand,
counsel for the defendant will have at his disposal a small army of noted
physicians, all anxious to make the fatal incision into the plaintiff's claim
for relief.
In the light of all this, the "Adverse Witness Rule,' 7 construed to

allow the plaintiff to elicit expert testimony from the defendant, may be
the most direct and inexpensive cure for the conspiracy.18
II.

EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADVERSE WITNESS RULE

A.

The Minority Rule

At common law, a party could not compel his adversary to testify. 9
On the other hand, Chancery followed the rule of the ecclesiastical courts
to compel each party to the suit to testify. 0 Statutes and rules in the
United States have abolished the common law rule concerning adverse
2

witnesses .1

Seizing upon the language of these statutes and rules, lawyers argued
early that the defendant physician should be compelled to divulge his expertise for the benefit of the court, especially as to the applicable standard
of care. The courts which first 22 discussed the problem objected on

three major grounds. First, the courts announced that it was contrary to the
purpose and intent of the statute to allow the plaintiff to make out his
case in chief by expert evidence secured from the defendant. Secondly,
P.2d 170, 175 (1957). See also Christie v. Callahan, 124 F.2d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ; Cases
cited note 3 supra; Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1
V=u.. L. REV. 250 (1956).
16. Anyone familiar with cases of this character [malpractice) knows the so-called
ethical practitioner will not testify on behalf of a plaintiff regardless of the merits of
his .case. This is largely due to the pressure exerted by medical societies and public
insurance companies which issue policies of liability insurance covering malpractice
claims ....
Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 484, 234 P.2d 34, 46 (1951).
17. See, e.g., FLA. R. Cxv. PRo. 1.450 (a).
18. See Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN.
L. REV. 455 (1962); King, The Adverse Witness Statute and Expert Opinion, 4 WAYNE L.
REV. 228 (1958); Note, 70 Dicx. L. REV. 394 (1966); Note, 33 FoRHrAM L. REV. 732 (1965);
Note, 51 IOWA L. REV. 731 (1966); Note, 11 N.Y.L.F. 160 (1965); Note, 17 W. RES. L. REV.
608 (1965); Note, 5 So. CALMF. L. REV. 448 (1931) ; Comment, Malpractice Actions--Scope
of Examination Under Adverse Witness Statute, 34 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 416 (1966).
19. 8 J. WiooE, EVMENCE §§ 2217, 2218 (McNaughton ed. 1961). In R. v. Woburn, 10
East 395, 403, 103 Eng. Rep. 825, 828 (1808), Ellenborough, L.C.J. said: "It is a longestablished rule of evidence that a party to the suit cannot be called upon against his will by
the opposite party to give evidence." See also People ex rel. Kraushaar Bros. Co. v. Thorpe,
296 N.Y. 223, 72 N.E.2d 165 (1947); Mauran v. Lamb, 7 Cow. 174 (N.Y. 1827).
20. Storey v. Lord Lennox, 1 Keen 341, 350, 48 Eng. Rep. 341, 343 (1836).
21. 7 J. WixcmoRE, EvmENcE § 2218 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
22. Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 P. 967 (1913), aff'd, 28 Idaho 89, 152 P. 473
(1915); Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389, 237 N.W. 915 (1931), overruled by Iverson v.
Lancaster, - N.D. -, 158 N.W.2d 507 (1968). See also Hull v. Plume, 131 N.JJL. 511, 516-17,
37 A.2d 53, 56 (1944).
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to compel such testimony of the defendant would give the plaintiff an
unfair advantage.2 3 Finally, while the physician as an adverse witness
could be compelled to testify to facts within his knowledge-that is, what
he actually saw and did-he should not be required to testify whether his
actions deviated from the accepted standard of medical practice in the
community. The courts which had discussed the issue unanimously held
that such examination would not be permitted. The now defunct majority
position was based upon the construction of the Idaho adverse witness
rule24 by the court in Osborn v. Carey:2 "The statute was not intended
to enable an adverse party to call an opposing party as an expert and seek
to establish his side of the case by such expert evidence." 6
B.

The Development of the Majority Rule

Beginning in 1941 with the case of Anderson v. Stump, 7 and later,
Lawless v. Calaway,2 8 the states began to question, and finally, 29 to
repudiate the previous construction of the adverse witness statutes. The
vanguard California courts, construing a statute similar in wording 0 to
that of Idaho3 and North Dakota,3 2 replaced the question "Why?" with
the more helpful quaere, "Why not?":
Neither the letter nor the spirit of the statute suggests any
reason why the defendant in such action should not be examined
with regard to the standard of skill and care ordinarily exercised by doctors in the community under like circumstances, 3
The obvious purpose of the statute, the courts reasoned, was to permit
the production in each case of all pertinent and relevant evidence avail-

able from the parties to the action.3 4
23. See, e.g., the analysis of Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389, 237 N.W. 915 (1931) in
Note, 5 So. CAiFn. L. REV. 448, 449-50 (1931):

[T]o compel the defendant to testify under the statute would give the plaintiff an
unfair advantage in that he would be in a position to accept whatever favorable
testimony he could bring out under the liberal rules of cross-examination, and yet,
under what seems to be the reasonable interpretation of the statute, be able to
impeach the defendant if the answer were unfavorable.
Hunder was recently overruled by Iverson v. Lancaster, - N.D. -, 158 N.W.2d 507 (1968).
24. IDAHO SEss. LAWS 1909 at 334, now IDAHO R. CIV. P. 43(b).
25. 24 Idaho 158, 132 P. 967 (1913).
26. Id. at 168, 132 P. at 970.
27. 42 Cal. App. 2d 761, 109 P.2d 1027 (1941). The court stated: "Having in mind
the fact that Dr. Stump was a practicing physician and was engaged by Mrs. Anderson for the
specific purposes of her confinement, it is obvious that he became a material witness to the
case."
28. 24 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944).
29. See note 60 infra and accompanying text.
30. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 2055.
31. Ino
SEss. LAWS 1909 at 334, now IDAHO R. Civ. P. 43(b).
32. Laws of N.D. 1907, ch. 4, now N.D.R. Civ. P. 43 (b).
33. Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81, 90, 147 P.2d 604, 609 (1944).
34. Id. See also the statement in the recent case of Iverson v. Lancaster, - N.D. -, 158
N.W.2d 507 (1968):
[B]y allowing the plaintiff to examine the defendant doctor with regard to the
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At the same time, other courts allowed this type of examination
based upon a comparison of the applicable statutes. The statutes as-

sumed were of two forms. Statutes in the states which adopted a restrictive view usually provided that "a party to the record of any civil action

or proceedings may be examined by the adverse party as if under crossexamination . . . . , Those states which adopted a contrary view were
usually construing a statute which provided: "Any party may call as a
witness any adverse party ... and interrogate him by leading questions

and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called
by the adverse party."' 6
Based upon this difference in wording, some courts reached the con8
clusion of the court in State v. Brainin.
That court construed the latter
of the above-mentioned forms of statutes" to be liberal in scope. Refusing

to follow the then-majority rule on the ground that the majority 9 were
construing statutes much narrower in scope than the Maryland statute in
question, the court said: "Furthermore, it seems plain that the statute in
this state is broad enough to encompass whatever expert knowledge the
party called as an adverse witness may possess." 4 0

However, it is interesting to note that not all of the states followed
the rationale of the court in Brainin. For example, in a Minnesota case,
42
Ericksen v. Wilson,41 the court was faced with a rule similar in wording
standard of skill and care ordinarily exercised by physicians in the community under
like circumstances and with regard to whether his conduct conformed thereto, even
though such questions call for the expression of an expert opinion, the courts do no
more than conform to the obvious purpose underlying the adverse-party-witness rule.
That purpose, of course, 'is to permit the production in each case of all pertinent and
relevant evidence that is available from the parties to the action.'
Id. at 158 N.W.2d at 521.
35. See, e.g., Osborne v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 168, 132 P. 967, 970 (1913), construing
Idaho Sess. Laws 1909 at 334, now IDAHO R. Civ. P. 43 (b) :
Where a witness is called under the provisions of that act, he may be examined by
the adverse party as if under cross-examination, subject to the rules applicable to the
examination of other witnesses, but it is contrary to the purpose and reason of that
statute to allow the plaintiff to make out his case in chief by expert opinion evidence
secured from defendant under cross-examination. If the plaintiff desires to make his
case by expert evidence from defendant himself, he must call him as his own witness,
but is not permitted to do so under the provisions of the statute.
36. MD. CODE ANN. art. 35, § 9 (1957) ; FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.450(a) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 43(b).
See also N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 4512: "A person shall not be excluded or excused from being
a witness, by reason of his interest in the event or because he is a party ....
37. 224 Md. 156, 167 A.2d 117 (1961).
38. MD. CODE ANN. art. 35, § 9 (1957).
39. Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 P. 967 (1913); Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 37
A.2d 53 (1944); Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389, 237 N.W. 915 (1931), expressly overruled
by Iverson v. Lancaster, - N.D. -, 158 N.W.2d 507 (1968); Wiley v. Wharton, 68 Ohio
App. 345, 41 N.E.2d 255 (1941); Forthofer v. Arnold, 60 Ohio App. 436, 21 N.E.2d 869
(1938).
40. State v. Brainin, 224 Md. 156, 161, 167 A.2d 117, 119-20 (1961). See also Iverson v.
Lancaster, - N.D. -, 158 N.W.2d 507 (1967).
41. 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963); see also Hoffman v. Naslund, 274 Minn. 521,
144 N.W.2d 580 (1960), which reiterated the position taken in Ericksen.
42. Mn,,-. R. Civ. P. 43:02:
A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by leading questions. A
party may call an adverse party . . . and interrogate him by leading questions and
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to the statute4 3 in Brainin.Despite this fact, the court held that the plaintiff could not compel expert44 testimony from the defendant "under the
guise of cross-examination."1
Furthermore, inconsistency of judicial construction is seen in the
recent Ohio case of Oleksiw v. Weidener.4 5 There, although construing a
statute of the more "narrow" class, 46 the court nevertheless held that "the
and examcases which permit the plaintiff to call the defendant physician
'4 7
ine him as an expert represents the more enlightened view."
In light of these observations, it seems clear that the basis upon
which the courts align themselves with one camp or another is not the
wording of the statutes. Rather, it is obvious that the courts are weighing
what they consider to be the contrasting public policy considerations.
As mentioned above, 48 the older view of this area of the law was influenced by three arguments, two of which were, (1) that the statute
was not intended to permit this type of examination, and (2) that such
an examination would be basically unfair. However, these considerations
are not separate. On the contrary, the fact that it may be viewed as unfair
undoubtedly influences the court's view of the intent of the statute.
Clearly, this indulgence into judicial sportsmanship is the guiding light
of the present minority rule. It is to be expected, therefore, that the
courts which have repudiated the old-line view, have directed an attack
on the moral sense of the older decisions. 49 For example, in Oleksiw v.
Weidener,50 the court refused to follow two previous Ohio decisions5' and
the minority's preoccupation with fairness; the court said the following:
No question of fairness should be involved in this matter. A person has no right to remain silent if he has information which is
needed in a judicial proceeding. Since the withholding of relevant
testimony obstructs the administration of justice, the duty to
testify is owed to society not to the individual parties. The
question is not whether it is fair for a party to require the adverse party to testify, but whether it is fair for society to
contradict and impeach him on material matters in all respects as if he had been
called by the adverse party.
43. MD. CODE ANN. art. 35, § 9 (1957).
44. Ericksen v. Wilson, 266 Minn. 401,123 N.W.2d 687 (1963).

45. 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965).
46. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.07 (Page 1954):

At the instance of the adverse party, a party may be examined as if under crossexamination, orally, by way of deposition, like any other witness. . . . The party
calling for such examination shall not thereby be concluded but rebut it b evidence.
47. Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 150, 207 N.E.2d 375, 377 (1965).
48. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
49. See King, The Adverse Witness Statute and Expert Opinion, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 228
(1958).
50. 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965).
51. Wiley v. Wharton, 68 Ohio App. 345, 41 N.E.2d 255 (1941); Forthofer v. Arnold, 60
Ohio App. 436, 21 N.E.2d 869 (1938).
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require a5 2party to testify where his testimony will aid his
opponent.

Furthermore, the court rejected any analogy between a defendant in
a malpractice action and a defendant in a criminal prosecution. A civil
defendant has no protection against subjecting himself to liability. If his
testimony will provide facts which will aid the court at arriving at a just
decision, he has a duty to testify. "Any loss to the sporting aspect of adversary proceedings would be outweighed by the benefit to the judicial
'
system.' 5
The New York decision in McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear and
Throat Hospital4 was based on reasoning similar to that in Oleksiw. On
the intermediate appeal, the court had followed the older view in reversing
the trial court's decision to allow the plaintiff to elicit expert testimony
from the defendant physician. The court reasoned that in requiring the
testimony of the defendant, relating to the standard by which the jury
was to judge the conduct of the defendant, the "plaintiff invites the jury
to be guided by a standard furnished by a source condemned by her." '
The New York Court of Appeals, reversing the supreme court, observed
that courts are intent upon arriving at just decisions and upon employing
properly expedient means to attain that end. If a defendant in a malpractice action can truthfully testify that his conduct conformed to the
standard required, his case would be substantially strengthened. If, on
the other hand, he cannot so testify, the plaintiff's chances of recovery
are unquestionably increased. "In either case, the objective of the court
in doing justice is achieved." 5
Finally, as stated before, the minority's third argument was that
while the defendant physician could testify as to facts, i.e., what he did
and what he saw, he was not required to give an opinion on whether he
deviated from standard procedure. This argument was attacked in the
recent case of Iverson v. Lancaster 7 which expressly overruled the
stronghold minority case of Hunder v. Rindlaub:55
52. Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 149, 207 N.E.2d 375, 377 (1965).
53. Id. at 150, 207 N.E.2d at 377.
54. 15 N.Y.2d 20, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65, 203 N.E.2d 469 (1964) rev'g 16 App. Div. 2d 374,
228 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
55. McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Eear and Throat Hosp., 16 App. Div. 2d 374, 379, 228
N.Y.S.2d 143, 149 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
56. McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65,
72, 203 N.E.2d 469, 474 (1964). The court also said:
[Tihe very inability of a plaintiff in a malpractice action to compel the attendance
and testimony of a 'disinterested' medical witness underscores the need and im-portance of allowing such a plaintiff the opportunity of questioning his adversary as
an expert.
Id. at 29, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 73, 203 N.E.2d at 475.
57. - N.D. -, 158 N.W.2d 507 (1968).
58. 61 N.D. 389, 237 N.W. 915 (1931).
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That the defendant is an 'expert' and that the particular questions asked of him are those which only an expert can answer,
seem beside the point. It is at least arguable that the doctor's
knowledge of the proper medical practice and his awareness of
his deviation from that standard in the particular case are, in a
real sense, as much matters of 'fact' as are the diagnosis and
examination he made or the treatment upon which he settled. 9
III.

A.

THE PRESENT POSITION

Other Jurisdictions

Regardless of what form the adverse witness statute takes, the majority rule in this country is that in a malpractice action, expert testimony may be elicited from a defendant physician called by the plaintiff.60
California," l Connecticut,62 Maryland, 3 Michigan,6 4 New Jersey, 5 New
York,6 6 North Dakota,67 and Ohio6" provide direct support for the rule.
Massachusetts,"0 West Virginia, 70 and Wisconsin 71 provide collateral support. The majority rule is also buttressed by the federal courts construing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(b) to allow this kind of
72

examination.
On the other hand, the only jurisdiction which has recently reaffirmed
59. - N.D. -, 158 N.W.2d at 521.
60. See cases collected in Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1186 (1963).
61. Libby v. Conway, 13 Cal. Rptr. 830, 192 P.2d 865 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Sheffield
v. Runner, 163 Cal. App. 2d 48, 328 P.2d 828 (1958); McCurdy v. Hatfield, 30 Cal. 2d 492,
183 P.2d 269 (1947) ; Lashley v. Koerber, 26 Cal. 2d 83, 156 P.2d 441 (1945) ; Lawless v.
Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944); Anderson v. Stump, 42 Cal. App. 2d 761, 109
P.2d 1027 (1941).
62. Snyder v. Pantaleo, 143 Conn. 290, 122 A.2d 21 (1956).
63. State v. Brainin, 224 Md. 156, 167 A.2d 117 (1961).
64. Dark v. Fetzer, 6 Mich. App. 308, 149 N.W.2d 222 (1967).
65. Rogotzki v. Schept, 91 N.J. Super. 135, 219 A.2d 426 (1966).
66. McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 255 N.Y.S.2d 65, 203 N.E.2d
469 (1964).
67. Iverson v. Lancaster, - N.D. -, 158 N.W.2d 507 (1968). The court, in overruling
Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389, 237 N.W. 915 (1931) said:
As our analysis of the trend of the law may have indicated, we are now convinced
that it is timely and proper, in light of the adoption of N.D.R. Civ. P. 43 (b) that
our decision in Hunder v. Rindlaub be overruled.
158 N.W.2d at 522.
68. Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965).
69. Manzoni v. Hamlin, 348 Mass. 770, 202 N.E.2d 264 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1964) (recognizing
principle).
70. Duling v. Bluefield Sanitarium, Inc., 149 W. Va. 567, 142 S.E.2d 754 (1965) (Not a
malpractice case. Plaintiff may call as a witness a physician who is a member of the hospital
staff and director of defendant hospital corporation, may interrogate him by questions in
hypothetical or other form and may require answers of him, including expressions of expert
opinions of witnesses, in all respects as if he had been called as a witness by and in behalf of
defendant).
71. Shurpit v. Brah, 30 Wis. 2d 388, 141 N.W.2d 266 (1966).
72. Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D. 594 (D. Pa. 1947).
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the minority position is Minnesota.7 3 Idaho 74 apparently has not repudiated the minority rule although the issue has not been discussed in that
state since 1913.
B.

Florida

The language of Rule 1.450 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure"
can be described as falling into the class of "liberal" adverse witness
statutes.7 6 Although the Florida courts have never been faced with the
problem discussed herein, 7 the author submits that under any reasonable
construction of the purpose and effect of the rule, the majority position
would be adopted in this state.
The physicians in Florida have not declared a truce in the "conspiracy of silence" noted above. Courts in this state, as those in other
jurisdictions, would benefit by having the defendant's expertise at their
disposal. If the physician must admit that his practice deviated from the
norm, both the court and the public could save time, energy, and expense. In liberalizing procedural standards, the Supreme Court of
Florida has indicated that our rules are more concerned with the ideal
of justice rather than the competition of the sport. Therefore, if the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are "to be construed to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action, ' 78 the plaintiff
should be allowed to elicit expert testimony from the defendant physician.
Such a construction of Florida's adverse witness rule at least will allow
a plaintiff in a malpractice action an equal opportunity to obtain the legal
73. Hoffman v. Naslund, 274 Minn. 521, 144 N.W.2d 580 (1966); Ericksen v. Wilson, 123
N.W.2d 687 (Minn. 1963).
74. Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 P. 967 (1913). See also Langford v. Issenhuth, 28
S.D. 451, 134 N.W. 889 (1912).
75. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.450(a) provides:
A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by leading questions. A
party may call an adverse party or any officer, director or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse
party and interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and impeach him in
all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party and the witness thus
called may be contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also
and may be cross-examined by the adverse party only upon the subject matter of
his examination in chief.
76. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
77. See Wigginton, New FloridaCommon Law Rules, 3 U. FLA. L. Rav. 1, 26-27 (1950):
The rule permitting the calling of an adverse party, which in Florida is new, hastens
considerably the possibilities of looking straight to the bottom of a weak case, and
forestalls in many instances the familiar muddying of the waters that all too often is
carefully planned . . . an adverse party may be called, interrogated by leading questions, contradicted, and impeached, just as if he had previously been called by his
own counsel. The method of the examination, in other words, is that of cross, but its
scope is that of direct.
78. FiA. R. Civ. P. 1.010. See also Wigginton, New Florida Common Law Rules, 3 U.
FLA.L. REv. 1, 3 (1950):
The chief objectives sought by the promulgation of these rules may be said to be
three-fold: to insure as nearly as possible that the side of the controversy that ought
to prevail will prevail; to permit speed, as distinct from haste, in the final disposition
of the cause; and to reduce the procedural cost to litigants.
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remedy to which he is entitled. Once the defendant has testified as an expert to the applicable standard of care, plaintiff's counsel can then move into
a discussion of the literature, perhaps challenging the defendant's testimony. This will normally present at least a jury question, preventing the
directed verdict which usually results from the absence of expert testimony. Moreover, the potential for the presentation of a jury question
will motivate insurance companies to more readily negotiate a settlement.
In the final analysis, the proper construction of the adverse witness rule
will perhaps provide a legal cure for the medical conspiracy of silence.

